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IS AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE A LEGAL RESPONSE                                                          
IF IRAN CLOSES THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ? 
 
MATTHEW O. WILLIAMS
† 
 
 Iranian lawmakers have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to 
European and American sanctions designed to curb Iranian oil exportation.
1
  One-
fifth of the world’s oil supply—mostly from other Arab nations—passes through the 
Strait every day, making the Strait’s maintenance vital to Western economies.
2
  On 
Monday, January 23, those sanctions, which aim to destabilize the Iranian economy 
in order to force Iran to negotiate the cessation of its nuclear weapons program, 
became a reality.
3
 
 Iran cannot legally close the Strait of Hormuz.  According to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), “[s]tates boarding straits shall not 
hamper transit passage.”
4
  Read in context, the treaty completely denies any right to 
block straits used for international passage, limiting bordering states to defining 
shipping channels and enforcing safety regulations.
5
  UNCLOS is customary 
international law, making compliance obligatory for all states.
6
  Thus, even though 
Iran has not ratified the Convention, it is subject to it; furthermore, the shipping 
channels are within the territorial Sea of Oman.
7
 
 The United States, chief among those insisting on the Strait remaining open, is 
not a party to UNCLOS, though American courts and one President have recognized 
UNCLOS’s status as customary international law.
8
  The use of American military  
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strength to enforce the terms of a document we refuse to sign is ironic at the very 
least. 
 UNCLOS, however, may hinder military action against Iranian attempts to close 
the Strait because it “impedes maritime interception in the territorial sea, where the 
coastal state enjoys sovereignty,”
9
 denying a right of action against threatening 
vessels that seek safety within the Iranian territorial sea. 
 Furthermore, UNCLOS requires parties—including most of Europe, and thus, 
presumably, NATO—to settle disputes concerning the treaty’s enforcement 
peaceably.
10
  Our recognition of the Treaty as customary international law, if not our 
signature, may also limit our unilateral military response capabilities. This is 
especially true considering that UNCLOS is the justification for denying Iran the 
right to close the Strait.  The rule of law loses much of its sheen if we enforce a 
treaty by breaking it. 
  
  
                                                 
9 Pedrozo, supra note 6, at 157. 
 
10 See UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 279. 
